Kalman a principled challenge to a rising movement of revolutionary reform." 6 Ackerman thus legitimates the Court's role in a representative democracy and safely distances law from politics. But I contend that he also participates in the debate in spite of himself. Ironically, given his celebration of the prudential value of the Old Court, Ackerman largely makes the case for the externalists.
In Part III, I query Ackerman's insistence that we should challenge the "basic premises" of the internalist/externalist controversy. Though old, the debate is neither tired nor unimportant. It yields important insights into political and intellectual history; Ackerman trivializes it when he says it focuses on the subjective motivations of Justices. In fact, the controversy between the externalists and internalists involves the legal academy's most enduring concern (and, as I suggest in Part V, one of the leitmotifs of the Ackerman corpus): the relationship between law and politics. Further, one strength of Ackerman's work is that it points the way towards a manner in which we may usefully draw on both internalist and externalist accounts.
In Part IV, I focus more closely on the history Ackerman advances in support of his attempt to establish a "New Deal" for New Deal constitutional historiography. I argue that in celebrating the prudentialism of the Old Court, his account overemphasizes its role in bringing about social change of which Ackerman approves. Pace Ackerman, we can neither glorify Roosevelt's legislative program of 1935, the "Second New Deal," nor give all the credit for its passage to the Old Court. Nor does Ackerman consider the impact of the Court-packing episode on politics. Whatever its connection to the Court's "switch in time," the Court-packing plan helped close off Congress and the executive branch as routes for reform. Roosevelt's attempt to respond to the Old Court's resistance by packing it with additional Justices proved a political disaster, which helped end the push for social change in the executive and legislative branches for a quarter-century, beginning in 1938. Consequently, the reformist programs of the next era were carried out under the auspices of the judiciary, which created growing concern that American society was court-centered. That anxiety led to the resurrection of the "countermajoritarian dilemma," which has long consumed Ackerman and other constitutional theorists.
In Part V, I turn to the theoretical underpinnings of Ackerman's project. I maintain that Ackerman's externalist approach to Court-packing is in tension with his own jurisprudential internalism, which reflects his own roots in the legal process school. That is, despite his externalist approach to New Deal constitutional change, Ackerman is generally suspicious of court-centrism; wary of the idea that judging is a political act; and hostile to the claim that in an important sense, law is politics. I argue that his 6. Id.
1999]
proposals for reclaiming the Constitution in the future reflect his attempt to separate law from politics and link him to both internalists and to the legal process school. Ultimately, his narrative and proposals are best understood as an outgrowth of his intellectual roots in the legal process tradition. In Part VI, I discuss my reaction to his proposals and speculate on some possible reasons for Ackerman's allegiances.
II. ACKERMAN AND THE REIGNING NARRATIVES
In We the People: Transformations, Ackerman continues the attack on "the Bicentennial myth" of American history as one republic that he began in We the People: Foundations. 7 "While all lawyers recognize that the 1930s mark the definitive constitutional triumph of activist national government," he explains, in the absence of formal Article V amendment of the Constitution, "they tell themselves a story which denies that anything deeply creative was going on." 8 Embracing "the myth of rediscovery as a convenient legal fiction," 9 lawyers maintain that " [t] he founders of the welfare state in America were not Roosevelt and his Democrats but Marshall and other Federalists who built the constitutional foundations of national power" and whose relevance the New Dealers rediscovered after 1937.10 In the words of Morton Horwitz, the legal community thus transformed the New Deal from "constitutional revolution' to "constitutional restoration." 11 Ackerman's assault on the "Bicentennial myth" deserves to carry the day. 12 And I think it has.' 3 At least, Ackerman has received aid from surprising quarters. I follow Lawrence Lessig in aligning myself with "the odd alliance" of Ackerman and Richard Epstein. 14 As Epstein puts it with characteristic pungency, there is only one response to the argument that the New Deal represents a return to the expansive view of the Commerce Clause set out in Gibbons v. Ogden: 5 "No way." 6 In Foundations, Ackerman goes beyond challenging the "myth of rediscovery," the reigning popular narrative lawyers have created for "the because of the threat posed by FDR's Court-packing plan. Politics explained the Court's shift. The internalists/legalists, on the other hand, point to doctrinal changes that began before 1937 and continued thereafter to emphasize the plausible internal and intellectual reasons for the Court's journey. They acknowledge that the shift reflected "dramatic changes in constitutional jurisprudence," 9 but they see it as more gradual and as more evolutionary than revolutionary. 2 "
Ackerman stresses the importance of turning the spotlight away from the "hidden wellsprings" of "the subjective motivations of the two Justices."' His "larger argument," he says, "does not depend on the ineffabilities of private motivation," ' but demonstrates "how judicial resistance contributed to the democratic character of the outcome." ' In the process of making that larger argument, however, Ackerman indicates he will "incorporat[e] the insights of both sides without going to either extreme." 24 I will evaluate Ackerman's larger argument on its own terms in Part IV. At present, I focus on how he enters the internalist-externalist debate despite himself. 17 Ackerman: 1935-37 I read Ackerman to embrace the externalist position. He talks of the "Old Court's early effort to say No to the New Deal"5 in 1935 and 1936 by waging "continued war on the liberal welfare state" 2 6 and striking down much of Roosevelt's 1933 legislative program. He emphasizes the loyalty of the majority of Justices to "the Lochnerian tradition," which awarded the market "constitutionally privileged status as a baseline." 27 As he sees it, the Justices were confronting a fundamental decision in March of 1937: on the one hand, they could stick to their guns in defense of the Lochnerian Constitution and run the clear and present danger that the People would formally repudiate the Court's traditional role in the separation of powers; on the other hand, they could eliminate the risk of hostile Article Five amendment by unequivocally recognizing the constitutional legitimacy of the New Deal vision of activist government. 28 Two events explained the Court's decision. The first was the " [t] riggering [e]lection of 1936," in which FDR won a landslide victory; the second was Roosevelt's effort to capitalize on his popularity by making an " [u] nconventional [t] hreat" to the Court by proposing to pack it with additional Justices. 2 9 What happened? According to Ackerman, thanks to the shift of Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts, a majority of the Court embraced "the constitutional legitimacy of the New Deal vision of activist government." 30 Ackerman maintains that the 1937 decisions were markedly different from their predecessors. In opinion after opinion in 1936, the majority of the Court had said "Yes" to upholding the traditional "federalist and free market Constitution." 31 But, "with blinding speed," the majority changed its answer to "No" in 1937. For lawyers, the meaning was evident: "Despite the Court's quasi-traditionalist dicta, the partisans of the traditional Constitution were now always on the losing side." 32 So far, Ackerman has proven even more externalist than the externalists. In the past, I have emphasized that, although FDR's stunning popularity had become apparent to all in the congressional elections of 25 Leuchtenburg, 4 I have also pointed out that, because the Court was not an issue in the 1936 campaign, it is implausible to think that the Justices would have interpreted the election results as a signal to mend their ways. Ackerman has gone us one better and argued, as some read Justice Roberts himself to have done later, 36 that the Justices learned from "th' iliction returns." 37 Perhaps he is correct: Leuchtenburg doubts "that we shall ever have a satisfactory answer to that question," but he observes that Justice Van Devanter's papers indicate that "he and men like him seriously thought a Republican victory possible in 1936." 38 William Forbath has demonstrated that though Roosevelt avoided the issue of the Court's decisions in 1936, the campaign was full of constitutional discourse and debate. 39 42 "The crucial fact is that they joined in creating opinions of the Court that had an obvious public meaning to the other participants in the constitutional conversation then raging about them." ' 43 The Justices themselves "killed Article Five" "by negotiating their 'switch in time,'""4 thereby making both the Court-packing plan and the formal constitutional amendments bruited about by Senator Wheeler and others unnecessary. Whatever their reason for it, their "switch allowed the Court to put a new question into play in its dealings with the outside world: 'Now that we have switched, is it really necessary to consider seriously a fundamental change in the structure of the Supreme Court?" 1 Chief Justice Hughes was prompted by politics, Ackerman suggests. True, the Chief Justice's decisions in 1937 "undoubtedly have some doctrinal roots," as the internalists maintain 2 But a "narrowly legalistic account" of his behavior seems "naive" to Ackerman.
A. The Externalist Case Made by
3 He contends:
All in all, Hughes's performance in 1937 is best seen as the product of constitutional statesmanship of the first order, by a man whose career-as governor of New York, secretary of state, and candidate for the presidency--enabled him to recognize the need for unconventional activity at a moment of grave crisis.'
What about Justice Roberts? According to Ackerman, the doctrinal reasons he later advanced for changing his Tipaldo vote in Parrish "simply don't hold up on legalistic grounds." '55 More to the point, Parrish is not a terribly important case anyway. It is a "typical phase-one product," 56 at most "an uncertain herald of revolutionary reform." '57 Roberts's relevance is not attributable to his vote in Parrish, so much as to "the remarkably consistent support he now gave to activist statutes that offended his previously proclaimed principles. If he had switched back to the conservative side in subsequent cases, the decision in Parrish would have been insufficient to defuse the crisis." " For Ackerman, the most important case of the trio is Jones & Laughlin. "If Justice Roberts had joined the four conservatives in striking down the act, the Justices would have deprived the New Deal of its only creative solution to the proliferating sit-down strikes that were precipitating all-out class war in America's industrial heartland." 59 Consequently, it does not surprise Ackerman that "the majority's decision in Parrish had no measurable impact on the Gallup Polls, but that its subsequent opinion in 63 where, they say, Justice Roberts's majority opinion made possible a "revolution in due process doctrine" by discarding the public/private distinction.' Consequently, to use Cushman's memorable sentence: "The empire of substantive due process was already in a state of collapse when the Parrish decision officially lowered the flag over its last colony." 65 Friedman does take Justice Roberts to task for "judicial timidity" in Tipaldo and for waiting until Parrish to board the bandwagon to overrule Adkins. 66 He is even willing to concede that perhaps Justice Roberts's vote in Parrish may be explained by the hostile reaction of the public to "Tipaldo itself," as opposed to the results of the 1936 election. 67 Cushman, of course, is unwilling to go this far. 8 Friedman 75 Once again, according to Cushman, the dates on which the decisions were handed down casts doubt on the notion that Roosevelt's assault against the Court intimidated Justice Hughes or Justice Roberts. Carmichael was decided ten weeks "before the Court-packing plan was known to any but the most intimate of Roosevelt's advisers." Steward and Helvering, the other two Social Security cases, "were handed down over three weeks after it was widely known that the committee would issue an adverse report and that the opposition had enough votes to defeat the bill in a vote on the Senate floor." 76 And others promoting alternatives to the Plan,"' Ackerman reminds us that Wheeler sought to fight the fire of Roosevelt's Court-packing plan with fire, in the form of a constitutional amendment. 2 The battle between the Senator and President, then, was not about whether the Court needed to be curbed. To a large extent, Ackerman reminds us, they "were on the same wavelength," 1 3 both creating "mechanisms that sought to supplement the existing provisions of Article Five by limiting the Supreme Court to a suspensive veto rather than the absolute veto it had traditionally exercised over democratic legislation." '04 They disagreed "on a narrow, but fundamental issue" 10 5 -whether the President, through judicial reorganization, or Congress, through constitutional amendment, should take the lead in reining in the Court."e [1933] [1934] [1935] [1936] [1937] [1938] , at 114-16, 120-24 (1993) (discussing the contemporary argument that Roosevelt's Court-packing plan represented a march towards dictatorship); cf. BAKER, supra note 92, at 140 (arguing that Wheeler's proposal "undoubtedly was the more dangerous to the American system of government. If the principle of a Congressional veto over Supreme Court decisions were written into the Constitution, it could not be revoked except with great difficulty. The loss of the Court's power would be nearly as permanent as anything can be in the American system of government... If the Roosevelt plan passed, however, the Supreme Court would have the opportunity to regain its independence at a later time" because once FDR had made his new appointments to the bench, "there would be no way the President could touch them."). For Kalman Refusing to be drawn into the "morass" of the internalist-externalist debate, 7 however, Ackerman does not seriously engage with the internalists about the doctrinal underpinnings of the three 1937 cases. He limits himself to giving their emphasis on Nebbia the back of his hand. 108 Further, he flatly insists Justices Hughes and Roberts's votes in Jones & Laughlin, delivered at a time when they had "full knowledge of Roosevelt's threat," were "blatant[ly] inconsisten[t]" with their earlier actions in Carter v. Carter Coal Co."° Of course, the Court spoke "the language of continuity," though their very holdings bespoke "the fact of rupture," Ackerman acknowledges." The Justices had reached "Phase One" of a turning point. 1
D. 1937's Aftermath
Here, Ackerman believes he shifts to the internalist side, emphasizing that the Court had more work to do to bring rupture. One point of the debate between externalists and internalists (the more important one, by my lights) concerns the reasons for the Court's shift: politics or doctrine. But timing plays an important part in the dispute as well. 2 According to Ackerman, the externalists find a constitutional "revolution" of 1937. The abruptness of the change lends credence to their explanation that political pressure caused it. The internalists point to an "evolution" in constitutional doctrine that began before 1937 and continued afterwards to show that the political forces, which buffeted the Court in 1937, could not have explained the changes in doctrine.
Ackerman maintains that he converges with the internalists in saying the "paradigm shift" was not apparent until the early 1940s.3 According to Cushman:
It was the replacement of the Nine Old Men with younger men who had more recently come to legal maturity-men who, though not Ackerman 
1999]
without difficulty, were able to break free of an older constitutional vocabulary and embrace a new conception of the judicial function-that brought forth a new paradigm for commerce clause jurisprudence. This-not the plot of the conventional story of capitulation to external political pressure-was the "structure" of the constitutional revolution' 1 4
The irony is not lost on Cushman. What it means is that externalists, who claim the Supreme Court followed the election returns, are correct, "not because the results of the 1936 election persuaded the Nine Old Men to ratify the New Deal, but because the Democratic victory enabled Franklin Roosevelt, through the power of appointment, to refashion the High Court in his own image."" 5 Certainly no externalist has published the kind of extended treatment of Commerce Clause doctrine after 1937 that Cushman has. The ample evidence Cushman provides of contemporary reaction seems to undercut Ackerman's insistence that the 1937 decisions possessed obvious public meaning;" 6 some commentators thought that even after 1937, Schecter" 7 and Carter Coal remained good law."' Cushman also convincingly shows that Justice Roberts could have gone along with labor decisions the Court handed down in the wake of the Wagner Act," 9 for example, "without having an experience akin to that of Paul on the road to Damascus." 2 0 So, too, Cushman's careful explication of Court memoranda demonstrates that Darby was no mere "footnote to Jones & Laughlin, a foregone conclusion entailed by a revolutionary decision taken in 1937." "2 And, according to 114 . CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 224. 115. l at 224; see also Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 against the challenge that federal power to regulate commerce did not extend to a farmer who produced and consumed wheat he never marketed); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, which provided wages and hours regulation for all employees in industries involving products shipped in interstate commerce, to the hours and wages of workers in a Georgia lumberyard, whose operations were exclusively intrastate, and overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) According to Ackerman, the famous footnote 4, 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4, of Carolene Products "offered up a theory of New Deal democracy as an organizing framework" as something of a "trial balloon[]," whose implications would "take years" to work out. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 369. "While judges should defer to the legislature in ordinary economic disputes, 'a more exacting judicial scrutiny' might be required when the democratic process malfunctioned-either when the majority denied opponents crucial political rights or when legislation was motivated by prejudice against 'discrete and insular minorities."' Id. For the argument that bifurcated, two-tiered judicial review originated not in Carolene Products but in the free speech/civil liberties decisions of the Court in the period immediately after World War I, see G. It is no answer.., to insist that what the provision of the Constitution meant to the vision of that day it must mean to the vision of our time. If by the statement that what the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it means to-day, it is intended to say that a the great clauses of the Constitution must be confined to the interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time, would have placed upon them, the statement carries its own refutation. It was to guard against such a narrow conception that Chief Justice Marshall uttered the memorable waming-"We must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding" --"a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." 290 U.S. at 442-43. In contrast, Justice Sutherland contended:
White makes clear in his forthcoming reassessment of the Constitution and New Deal, 16 ' was modernism.
Yet if I am now more prepared to acknowledge that the "alien influence" of modernism had appeared at the Court than I was before reading Cushman and Friedman's work, I wonder if it had prevailed before 1937-1942. One job of the historiin is to view matters as they must have seemed to actors at the time; and at the time, not everyone perceived either Nebbia or Blaisdell as a big deal for the New Deal.' 6 2 The Court fight was a symptom of the battle over whether to view the Constitution through a modernist lens. 63 Thus, I would still emphasize the importance of politics to understanding "1937," the Court-packing episode.
A provision of the Constitution... does not admit of two distinctly opposite interpretations. It does not mean one thing at one time and an entirely different thing at another time. If the contract impairment clause, when framed and adapted, meant that the terms of a contract for the payment of money could not be altered [by passage of] a state statute enacted for the relief of hardly pressed debtors to the end and with the effect of postponing payment or enforcement during and because of an economic or financial emergency, it is but to state the obvious to say that it means the same now. Id. at 448-49 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). Justices Hughes and Sutherland continued their argument in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). See 300 U.S. at 390 (Hughes, C.J.) (stating that the change in "economic conditions" since Adkins occasioned "fresh consideration" of the state's minimum wage statute); 300 U.S. at 403 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (insisting that "to say.., that the words of the Constitution meant today what they did not mean when written-that is, that they do not apply to a situation now to which they would have applied then-is to rob that instrument of the essential element which continues it in force"); see also White, Reassessment, supra note 131, at 45-52.
161. White, Reassessment, supra note 131, ch. VII, 28-36. For a discussion of the significance of the majority and dissenting opinions in Blaisdell and their implications for modernism, see Lessig, supra note 14, at 457-61; White, Reassessment, supra note 131, at 28-36.
162. See Pepper, supra note 118, at 67 (suggesting that "even in 1934, Nebbia and Blaisdell held enigmatic places amid the Court's generally conservative jurisprudence" and, contending further, "that any potentially broad interpretation of those holdings rapidly disappeared amid strikingly divergent Court decisions that followed." Id. at 146. Even White observes that "a suggestion made by one of the Court's less visible justices in a police power/due process case involving price regulation [ Rather than seeing the constitutional revolution of the New Deal as a product of the Court-packing crisis, it is more profitable to think of the Court-packing crisis as a product of a constitutional revolution, one whose revolutionary character was far deeper and wider than any "switch in time." By assuming that the Supreme Court of the United States could be 'packed with persons who would be sympathetic to the political goals of the Roosevelt Administrations, and who would translate that sympathy into constitutional doctrine, the proponents of Court-packing were taking as a given that America was a government of men, not laws. Theirs was a modernist, "living" view of constitutional interpretation (emphasis added). Id. Clearly, White has made an important contribution in presenting the New Deal as a constitutional revolution in modernism. See also Lessig, supra note 14, at 453 (reaching a similar conclusion as White in emphasizing the significance of both "changes in the economic and social reality that law regulated" and "changes in law's understanding of itself' to understanding the changes wrought by the New Deal Morton Horwitz has pointed out that so as long as we read Leuchtenburg's marvelous essay about Justice Roberts's "almost medieval" conception of "'the relation of employer and employee' in Alton (an opinion that strikes even Friedman as reactionary)," 6 it will remain difficult for us to understand the Justice Roberts of two years later without finding any explanation other than politics convincing."' In my heart, I still believe the Justice Roberts of 1937 had undergone a jurisprudential lobotomy, though I am able to see that possibly he was more of a "man of law" than I had imagined. Like Leuchtenburg, I believe the Court beat "a strategic retreat... largely in response to the Court-packing plan," led by Chief Justice Hughes, ",a very adroit politician," obsessed with preserving his body's institutional integrity. 166 Just as the New Deal saved capitalism by reforming it, so the Justices accelerated a process of reform in 1937, which saved the Court from Court-packing and transformed constitutional jurisprudence by 1942.
Does any of this matter? Of course it does. Ackerman trivializes the disagreement between exteralists and internalists when he suggests that it simply concerns the subjective motivations of two Justices. At bottom, Horwitz also stresses, this debate is about the central issue of legal thought during the last sixty years, the relationship between law and politics. 1 Our obsession with that issue grows out of the coincidence and confluence of legal realism and the New Deal, the synergy of law and politics during one of the most pivotal moments in American history.' 68 appreciation of changes in the economic and social reality that law regulated during the early days of the New Deal, which helps to explain the initial success of the emergency power doctrine in cases such as Blaisdell). Hulsebosch points to the roles played by the rise of totalitarianism and the long term nature of the Depression in causing the Court's abandonment of the emergency rationale by 1935 
B. Where We Stand
Where we stand on the issue of law's relationship to politics reflects our jurisprudential proclivities and the location in the academy from which we write. Cushman's work has moved me away from a crude realism emphasizing the role of idiosyncrasy in explaining individual judicial decisions towards critical legal studies. 169 For, as he set out to do, and as critical legal scholars have done, 170 Cushman has demonstrated law's relative autonomy."' And he has done so in the context of one of the critical legal scholars' favorite whipping boys-the public/private distinction, no less! 172 But what does that mean? Did "law" and "doctrine" account for "1937" ? Do they explain the behavior of Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts? Perhaps, but not necessarily. In the instance of the Court fight, a critical legal scholar might conclude that relative autonomy functioned to maintain the hegemony of elites by saving the Justices from Court-packing.
I doubt Cushman set out to write a brief for critical legal studies. Rather, I imagine he intended to write one for those formalist turn-of-the-century Harvard law professors-or more probably, for their Legal Process successors who had to live in the post-realist, post-New Deal world. 173 Cushman the law professor reminds us that insights about law's relative autonomy "are not the exclusive province of Gramscian Marxists and critical anti-functionalists." They also appear in "Roscoe Pound's ruminations on the 'tenacity of a taught legal tradition;'... in Frederic Maitland's equally alliterative aphorism, 'taught law is tough law"'; and in Charles Curtis's insistence that the Old Court exemplified the "Legal Tradition." 7 4 Cushman continues:
169. John Henry Schlegel first pointed out the connection between Cushman's articles and critical legal studies to me. Cushman has made that connection clearer in his book. See CUSHMAN 173. I emphasize that the key word here is "imagine." John Henry Schlegel pointed out to me that our lack of certainty about Cushman's politics in the world of the legal academy, where academics' politics are generally so clear, may be one reason his intemalism makes us nervous.
CUSHMAN, supra note 1, at 41 (quoting CHARLES CURTIS, LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 190-91 (1947)).
These scholars have all been trying to remind us that legal history is not simply political history, or social history, or economic history; legal history is also intellectual history. Judges are participants not merely in a political system, but in an intellectual tradition in which they have been trained and immersed, a tradition that has provided them with the conceptual equipment through which they understand legal disputes. To reduce constitutional jurisprudence to a political football, to relegate law to the status of dependent variable, is to deny that judges deciding cases experience legal ideas as constraints on their own political preferences. 175 As a still skeptical externalist, I have resolved to treat the internalists with greater respect. I do not go as far (of course!) as Cushman in maintaining that no "reductionist" model is sufficient to explain the New Deal Justices' behavior. The model that so irritates him may indeed account for the Justices' actions. But Cushman has made a convincing case that the reductionist model is not the only explanation. Sometimes precedents do guide results (recall, however, Llewellyn's discussion of sixty-four "available impeccable" techniques of handling precedent). 6 Cushman has given us a story that will resonate with those who believe judges are not identical to politicians and will enrich their understanding of judicial motivation. By taking New Deal constitutional jurisprudence on its own terms and making sense of it, he has demonstrated that legal history can indeed be a genre of intellectual history. I simply continue to be interested in legal history as political, economic, and social history also.
The intemalists might accord the externalists more respect too. They might ask why anyone would embrace the "reductionist model." The answer has to do with who we are: political historians. And that may make it as difficult for us to accept Ackerman's history as it is for us to drop our externalist model for an internalist one.
IV. ACKERMAN'S HISTORY

A. Ackernan's Account
In place of the traditional debate, Ackerman advances an arresting historical thesis, which has the effect of emphasizing the difference between law and politics and providing a reassuringly positive role for the old Court in furthering the cause of democracy. The "New Deal revolution" broke 175 . Id. at 41. Kalman with Article V by replacing a congressional model of leadership with a presidential one and by using "transformative opinions as amendment-analogues," 17 7 he maintains. Further, the two developments were related. "Rather than appearing as an inexplicable formal breach of Article Five, the New Deal Court's development of transformative opinions was an organic response to the rise of Presidential leadership in higher lawmaking." 17 In the context of the New Deal, he contends these developments were all to the good, the Court's role in bringing them about salutary. Ackerman breaks with both externalists and internalists, who he insists, perhaps unfairly, 179 have suggested that "the conflict between the Old Court and the New Deal was a waste of time." ' To the contrary, he tells us, the Court's intransigence forced FDR to reevaluate his course."
1 That was as it should be: In the context of "the dualist tradition, no movement for revolutionary reform can rightfully expect an easy victory for its transformative vision. It must earn its claim to speak for the People by repeatedly winning electoral support in the face of sustained constitutional critique." 2 Thus, in testing the New Deal, the Old Court did not betray traditional American constitutionalism, but recovered it. The Court was fulfilling its "preservationist function." " 3 How, exactly, did the Court ensure this process of reconceptualization by the President? By Ackerman's account, the First New Deal was truly radical. Next to everything else Congress approved, its "epochal decision to impose sweeping and continuing regulation on Wall Street seemed almost humdrum." "8 After all, "Congressional approval of the Tennessee Valley Authority inaugurated a national experiment with outright socialism."
5
Further, "the most important initiative of the first New Deal Congress," 6 the National Industrial Recovery Act, "proposed to abolish market 177. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 271.
2 id.
179. I certainly believe the conflict between the Old Court and the New Deal was a waste of time, and other externalists may also. But among the intemalists, Cushman suggests that the conflict between the Old Court and the New Dealers forced the New Dealers to draft better and more lawyerly legislation. See infra note 192. I take Cushman's tone to be one of approval. In another article, he has emphasized the extent to which, "in ways that Roosevelt apparently did not fully appreciate, but which others did, the Court was in fact cooperating with the political branches in seeking to formulate constitutional solutions to the economic crisis of the 1930s." Cushman, supra note 82, at 80. According to Ackerman, Roosevelt opted for the third route, embracing the "self-consciously constitutional" initiatives of the Second New Deal in 1935.192 That meant replacing "corporatism" with "nationalism," dropping "the all-embracing corporativism of the NIRA" and pursuing instead the kind of structural reforms he had favored with the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934.19' Thanks to the Court, "the imperative of central planning" 94 would make way for the birth "of a new freedom, defined in the light of modem realities that would otherwise defeat the claims of equal opportunity" and that could be achieved only "through democratic control of the marketplace."' 95 Ackerman elaborates:
This Second New Deal marked an important change in constitutional course. Rather than seeking to displace the competitive market with the NIRA, Roosevelt and Congress now accepted the market as a legitimate part of the emerging economic order-so long as regulatory structures could be introduced to correct abuses and injustices defined through the democratic process. [Vol.
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Security Act guaranteed all workers the prospect of a decent old age after their usefulness to the market was over. ... As the Democrats prepared for the 1936 elections, they would return to the voters as advocates of a regulated capitalism, proposing a series of focused structural initiatives by which the People might control, but not obliterate, the competitive market.' 96 In the meantime, the Court continued to contribute "to the democratic character of the ultimate outcome" by striking down other legislation in 1935 and 1936. That action had the effect of putting "Americans on notice that the New Deal was shaking the foundations-and that it was not too late to withdraw their mandate." 97 To preserve the momentum, Roosevelt now had to ensure that the Court would stay the course. Instead of using appointments to the Court for patronage purposes, he must take "constitutional ideology" into account in choosing Justices. 3 And for the most part, the President did. With the exception of James Byrnes, he restricted "his nominations to public adherents of the New Deal philosophy of activist government" and created "a founding precedent of the modem republic" by "redeeming the voice of the People" through "transformative appointments." 2 How did the Senate respond? Ackerman views the 1938 midterm election as a consolidating election where the Court was concerned, even as he acknowledges that "Republicans in the Senate failed to make the President's transformative strategy a campaign issue in 1938."205 Despite the emergence in 1938 of a conservative coalition in Congress that blocked reform in many areas, Republicans and Southern Democrats accepted "the New Deal revolution in the courts" and Roosevelt's appointments."' They rushed to confirm "three emphatic liberals to the Court in the next two years" 207 -Justices Frankfurter, Murphy, and Douglas.
More strikingly, perhaps, in the presidential election of 1940, the Republicans turned to Wendell Willkie. His article in the Saturday Evening Post predicting that when the public understood that the Roosevelt Court's decisions "have made the United States a national and no longer a Federal Government .... it will mightily rebel," helped propel him to "the center of Republican politics." Having won the nomination, however, Willkie proved "quite unwilling to make his jurisprudential essay in the Post the basis of a campaign onslaught against the New Deal Court," though perhaps he would have reacted to FDR's "series of liberal appointments" by beginning "a campaign for 'balance' on the Court" had he been elected."S Yet Willkie was not elected. The year 1940 proved yet another consolidating election. Roosevelt's triumph against the Republican nominee's charges that a third term represented a move towards dictatorship freed the President to make still more transformative appointments. All his nominees "were confirmed without a single vote of opposition-the liberal Stone replacing Chief Justice Hughes, the liberal Jackson replacing Stone, the liberal Wiley Rutledge replacing the misplaced Byrnes replacing the conservative McReynolds." 209 For Ackerman, this story yields several lessons. Ordinary Americans understood and accepted "the constitutional significance of the Supreme Court's transformation." So did Republicans. Had they intended to make it an important issue in the 1940 presidential election, they would have selected someone, such as Robert A. Taft, "to raise the banner of old-style conservatism." They chose Willkie instead because they knew that was not what Americans wanted. "The Republican convention of 1940 correctly understood that the country was proud of the way in which it had weathered the storms that had destroyed so many democracies in Europe; and that it would have no patience with a party that had promised to fight to the bitter end for lost constitutional causes." 2 10
The tone is one of admiration for Roosevelt's achievement in circumventing Article V and "federalist formalisms. '2 1 ' Ackerman hails the achievement of the New Dealers in devising "unconventional adaptations" that enabled "the citizenry to express sustained support for a more nationalistic, activist, pragmatic, and dialogic understanding of its 
B. Ackerman's Relationship to the Historiography
What can we say about this picture? To me, though the execution seems flawed, the overall effect is often pleasing. As I have said, Ackerman has persuaded me that the 1936 election results may indeed have represented, and been interpreted as, a referendum on the Court. 215 He has strengthened my (already firm) conviction that the Court switched under pressure, even though that was not his mission. He has made me see 1937, if not what followed, as a constitutional moment.
I especially admire Ackerman's emphasis on the importance of the President's behavior in causing the three branches of government to cooperate in acknowledging that the people had spoken in 1937. It supports the point that Roosevelt did not display his usual willingness to compromise during the Court fight because of his unusual understanding that all three branches of government, in the President's words, must be "'interdependent as well as independent, and that all three work together to meet the living generation's expectations of government.' ' 216 Thus, 212. 2 id. "I refuse, then, to join a formalist lament at the failure of an earlier generation of Americans to announce their constitutional intentions through Article Five Amendments. My attitude is closer to celebration than disdain." 2 id. For the arguments that a constitutional amendment might have been more easily enacted than Roosevelt said, and that "[f]ailure to pursue amendment meant ... that the New Deal was not erected on as strong and solid a constitutional foundation as might well have been possible at the time," see DAVID E. KYVIG, 
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Ackerman has done what most liberal historians, for all our qualified admiration of Roosevelt, have been unable to do: He has made the President's conduct during the Court fight seem sensible! Yet I find Ackerman's account overdetermined. It overemphasizes the role of the Court in bringing about social change that Ackerman considers positive. Like Zelig, the Court pops up everywhere, sometimes in places it does not belong.
Begin with the story of a First and Second New Deal provided 'm Transformations. Ackerman acknowledges neither that the idea of First and Second New Deals evokes different meanings for historians,"' nor that historians have challenged the suggestion of two separate New Deals. 21 Instead, he has exaggerated the coherence of the First New Deal and created a distorted impression of the rupture it represented. Indeed, Ackerman implicitly acknowledges this when he cites the elderly Herbert Hoover at his most reactionary as the source for the claim that the TVA (which the old Court upheld by an eight-to-one vote!) 2 19 represented "outright socialism." 220 The word "corporatism" is so protean (more so, even, than "liberalism" ) that it is unclear what Ackerman means by it. 221 But I tend to Certainly other forces had an impact on the New Dealers' 1935 legislative agenda. For example, the NRA's failure to bring recovery, the wishes of the more liberal members of Congress elected in the 1934 midterm elections, and Roosevelt's hope of blunting the threat posed by the redistributive schemes of Huey Long and Francis Townsend also helped to explain the Administration's support for the 1935 agenda." Though Ackerman curiously does not acknowledge it, so did "the People" themselves, namely, as William Forbath has said, workers speaking the language of "social citizenship."231 Leuchtenburg's characterization of Schechter as only "a final goad" to the New Dealers is the correct one."
Further, Ackerman exaggerates what happened in 1935. This is not to deny the significance of that year's legislative accomplishments but to say that he mischaracterizes them. Take, as an example, his statement that "the Social Security Act guaranteed all workers the prospect of a decent old age."33 Self-employed workers, farm laborers, and domestic servants excluded from coverage under the Act would have been surprised to hear that. 34 that the government was on their side-an important point, but a political rather than a legal one. 6 Indeed, Ackerman's celebration of the New Deal is sharply at odds with the historiography. Leuchtenburg's FDR and the New Deal 2 7 was the most influential book in inaugurating this generation of historians' debate over the achievements of Roosevelt's program." "The New Deal achieved a more just society by recognizing groups which had been largely unrepresented-staple farmers, industrial workers, particular ethnic groups, and the new intellectual-administrative class," 9 Leuchtenburg concluded: "Yet this was still a halfway revolution; it swelled the ranks of the bourgeoisie but left many Americans-sharecroppers, slum dwellers, most Negroes-outside of the new equilibrium." 2 That was an insight that the New Left ran with later in the decade, 241 paying no attention to constraints on the New Deal, such as the Court, 242 which Leuchtenburg 241. The outstanding example is Barton Bernstein's scathing critique of FDR and the New Deal for " [o] perating within very safe channels," not simply avoiding Marxism and socialism, but stopping "far short of other possibilities-communal direction of production or the organized distribution of surplus." Barton J. Bernstein, The Conservative Achievements of Liberal Reform, in THE NEW DEAL: THE CRITICAL ISSUES, supra note 238, at 147, 158. Bernstein dismissed Roosevelt and most New Dealers as "doctrinaires of the center," who limited their experiments at social reform "to cautious excursions. Usually opportunistic and frequently shifting, the New Deal was restricted by its ideology. It ran out of fuel not because of the conservative opposition, but because it ran out of ideas." Id.
242. Had the New Left historicans paid the Hughes Court any attention, they might have found that its overal record, as well as that of its most conservative members, supported the left's argument that New Deal reforms were less wide-ranging than liberal historians had maintained. "[Tihe Hughes Court at times anticipated the concerns of a later generation with the bureaucratic state, the abuses of private power, racial discrimination, and defects in the criminal justice system." Parrish, supra note 41, at 303; see also Cushman, The Secret Lives, supra note 1, at 560 (pointing to the liberal record of the Hughes Court).
"raw deal" for the one-third of the nation that FDR had promised to help. 243 Today, however, there is little enthusiasm for the broad argument that the New Deal represented a triumph for "corporate liberalism," 2 though few would deny that some corporate interests tried to mold the New Deal state to their purposes. 245 On the other hand, today, few consider the New Deal as revolutionary as Ackerman maintains, either. To quote Leuchtenburg, " [E] ven historians who dispute the New Left assertions agree that one can only take a melancholy view of the period."2 And as Alan Brindey said recently, "[Most historians in the last two decades have accepted some variation of Leuchtenburg's stance of muted praise."
'247 Ackerman's description of the New Deal makes Leuchtenburg's sound positively sour in comparison.
Is this important? To law professors, perhaps not. Why should Ackerman waste his time on an internecine dispute between historians over the First and Second New Deal and the achievements of the New Deal when he is not even interested in the debate between internalists and externalists over the Court? I recognize that law professors turn outward for their own purposes and have called for a disciplined interdisciplinarity, which neither treats other disciplines as window dressing nor is absorbed by them. 24 Nevertheless, there are several reasons that Ackerman needs to pay attention to the historians.
First, I agree with Martin Flaherty: "Legal arguments relying on economics, philosophy, or sociology are more convincing when they comport with the standards set by those disciplines. Nothing prevents the same point from applying to arguments based upon history." 249 Ackerman undercuts the credibility of his general thesis when he supports it with work that historians will find unconvincing. Second [Vol. 108:2165
Flaherty and me on this point, I follow him in falling back on a childhood aphorism: " [S] omething worth doing at all is worth doing well." " Third, if the question here is whether the response to New Deal legislation by both the Old Court and Roosevelt affected constitutional jurisprudence, it seems important to exercise care in characterizing both the legislation and historians' evolving views of its significance. For example, if the Wagner Act and Social Security were not the "revolutionary reforms" Ackerman contends, did the Supreme Court's decisions to uphold them represent constitutional transformations? Perhaps yes, perhaps not; recall Cushman's point about the "conservative" Justices' sympathy for Social Security. " Finally, what is at issue in Transformations is the power of "the people" working through all branches of government to bring about constitutional change without using the procedures set forth in Article V. I suspect Ackerman exaggerates .the accomplishment of the first term of the New Deal to inspire the people to work towards the general goal of "social justice in a liberal state" ' " without becoming overdependent on the Court.5 3 His account may prove pernicious in that it raises unrealistically high expectations for the kinds of constitutional change that can be accomplished through channels of which he approves. That may explain what William Forbath has described as Ackerman's studied silence on the text of his constitutional amendments,'" and whether the New Deal enacted a non-Article V amendment guaranteeing a right to welfare or redefined the concept of national citizenship. 5 If I am correct, law professors may find it useful for their own purposes to explore whether the New Deal was as much of a watershed as Ackerman contends. Court-packing in causing the New Dealers' congressional defeats in 1938. Court-packing was an important issue that year, and not one that helped the President. According to a recent book on the Republican Party during the New Deal, "Republican candidates continued to criticize the court reform proposal, making the spectre of 'one-man government' a recurrent theme. '' " Of course Court-packing was not the only flash point; the sit-down strikes, the President's attempt to "purge" his party of conservatives, and the "Roosevelt recession" also help to explain the success of conservative Southern Democrats and the Republicans' resurrection in the election. z 7
C. Of Subsequent Elections and Supreme Court Appointments
Thus, the suggestion that 1938 can be viewed as a "consolidating election" vis-a-vis Court-packing is odd. In fact, it appears that if 1937 witnessed the beginning of a "constitutional moment," the moment ended with the congressional elections of 1938. Assume, for a minute, that Scott Powe has correctly sythesized the substance of the New Deal transformation in two constituitonal amendments. Powe's "Amendment One" reads: " Of course, that does not matter if one agrees with Lawrence Lessig that we need no constitutional amendment equivalents to constitutionalize the New Deal, 2 60 a matter I leave to the law professors.
While the Court was an issue that hurt Roosevelt in the 1938 election, it had little bearing on voters' selections two years later, as Ackerman indicates. 26 263 In promoting Willkie as a vibrant internationalist, Time characterized Taft as "a tortoise," who heaped "one ineptitude on another." 2 " Nor did Taft's isolationism and his sometime insistence that the Nazis posed no danger to the United States help him." 6 The Republicans chose Willkie not only because, by the time they met in Philadelphia at the end of June, France had fallen and Britain stood alone against Hitler, but also because they thought the personable Willkie had the best chance against Roosevelt." 6 What Ackerman refers to as the Republicans' disinclination "to refight the constitutional battles of the 1930s, " 267 counted for virtually naught. Therefore, it also seems peculiar to regard 1940 as a "consolidating election" vis-A-vis the Roosevelt Court.
How, then, do we explain the easy congressional approval of Roosevelt's appointments to the Court? Ackerman has given us one way of understanding it, and perhaps it is the correct one. He may be right to say that the conservative coalition of Southern Democrats and Republicans in the Senate voted overwhelmingly to confirm Roosevelt's "emphatic [ But there may be other explanations. One is that Ackerman is anachronistic. Perhaps, save for the possible odd exceptions of the Brandeis, Parker, Haynesworth, and Fortas Chief Justiceship nominations, "ideology" proved relatively unimportant to the confirmation process in the twentieth century until the Bork hearings. 270 Certainly it seems relevant that of the twenty-five instances in which the Senate has rejected or forced a President to withdraw a Supreme Court nomination, only five have occurred since 1895.271 While the idea of a "spineless Senate" rubber-stamping presidential appointments to the Supreme Court in the twentieth century before Bork is surely overblown, 272 it may not be the "myth" that Laurence Tribe maintains it is either.
Another explanation for Senators' acquiescence is that they had bigger fish to fry. Consider that the Senate considered the appointments of Justices Frankfurter and Murphy at the same time it was reviewing the credentials of Progressive Thomas R. Aimlie for a position on the Interstate Commerce Commission. All three were "stamped with a radical stamp," conservative Senator Josiah Bailey said privately. 274 Nevertheless, the Senate blocked only Aimlie's appointment and confirmed Frankfurter and Murphy. "We must not waste our energy by fighting out issues on the smaller matters, nor should we do anything to take from the President the responsibility for the consequences of his six years," Bailey explained." "So, if we appear to be -yielding, just remember, we are 'stooping to conquer. 
D. Farewell to Reform
On the larger matters, conservatives usually prevailed, bringing us to my major problem with Ackerman's history. Ackerman's attitude compares to Roosevelt's in 1939. Remarking on his Court's decisions upholding the New Deal, the President claimed he had "lost the battle but won the war." 277 1 am more inclined to side with one historian, who concluded that, "[a]s matters turned out in Congress and party, it could better be said that he lost the battle, won the campaign, but lost the war." 27 8 No one has set out the disastrous consequences of Court-packing for the New Deal and the Roosevelt coalition better than Leuchtenburg. Courtpacking divided the Democrats and reformers; undermined middle-class and bipartisan support for the New Deal; and distracted FDR from the realm of foreign affairs at the same time that it increased congressional unwillingness to grant him discretion there. 279 Its defeat shattered the sense of the President's invulnerability."° "The new Court might be willing to uphold new laws, but an angry and divided Congress would pass few of them for the justices to consider," Leuchtenburg said.28l "The whole New Deal really went up in smoke as a result of the Supreme Court fight," one New Dealer mourned." 2 But more went up in smoke than Roosevelt's reform program. All of these consequences pale in importance next to the fact that Court-packing "helped blunt the most important drive for social reform in American history and squandered the advantage of Roosevelt's triumph in 1936" by welding together a bipartisan coalition of conservative Southerners and Republicans. 283 "Even as the Court fight began they were edging around each other, doing a dance of political Romeos and Juliets." ' The Republicrats diluted and often blocked further attempts at reform until 1 9 64 ," and liberalism suffered as a result. No longer as concerned with developing a class-based agenda as they had been between 1933 and 1938, postwar liberals focused on ensuring consumption and pressing the Court to articulate individual rights.
In fact, I suspect this loss points to the reason that as a political historian (and self-avowed liberal), I am so invested in the externalism explanation for the Court's shift. Court-packing proved the snowball triggering the 1937-1938 avalanche that blocked legislative reform at the national level until the 1960s. If we can at least say Court-packing may have caused a "switch" among the Justices, its high price becomes less painful.
One would not expect law professors to care as much about this as political historians. It is relevant, however, to academic lawyers. In closing off Congress as a locus for reform and helping to lessen the chance of electing a genuinely liberal President, Court-packing ensured that only an appointed body of elites, which did not serve at the pleasure of the people, could afford to redeem the "transformative promises" 17 of Roosevelt and his "closer continuer [s] ."" 2 5 The Court used the 1937 crisis to increase its power. 9 Court-packing led to the revival of the "countermajoritarian dilemma." 29 0 283. LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 2, at 157. Elsewhere, Leuchtenburg has identified the Court fight as "probably the most important single event in the creation of the conservative coalition that brought the New Deal to a virtual standstill by 1938." LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 38, at 224 (1988) . As in the cases of slavery and Reconstruction, "the nation had no real complaint with judicial power [in the New Deal] but only a disagreement with the Court over critical issues of national policy. Once those issues were resolved, the Court was quickly and unmistakably put back on its pedestal." Id.
290. Barry Friedman is exploring the "puzzling paucity of countermajoritarian criticism" during the New Deal, as compared with the Populist and Progressive eras. Friedman, supra note 116, at 24. Though the Court struck down legislative measures during both the New Deal and the Populist/Progressive periods, during the New Deal, complaints that the Court was a countermajoritarian force thwarting the will of the people took a back seat to the critique that "recalcitrant judges, old judges, horse-and-buggy judges ... just could not get it right. It was judges who were attacked during the New Deal, not courts, and not the institution of judicial review." Id. at 8. [Vol. 108: 2165
Kalman V. THE PERSISTENCE OF PROCESS
A. Ackerman and the "Countermnajoritarian Dilemma"
The countermajoritarian dilemma has shaped the professional life of Ackerman, who dedicated one of his earliest books to Alexander Bickel 29 1 and made one of the first attempts at identifying the members of the legal process school. 2 ' As Bickel set out the problem in its most famous formulation:
The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in our system. There are various ways of sliding over this ineluctable reality. Marshall did so when he spoke of enforcing, in behalf of "the people," the limits that they have ordained for the institutions of a limited government. And it has been done ever since in much the same fashion by all too many commentators. Marshall himself followed Hamilton, who in the 78th Federalist denied that judicial review implied a superiority of the judicial over the legislative power-denied, in other words, that judicial review constituted control by an unrepresentative minority of an elected majority. "It only supposes," Hamilton went on, "that the power of the people is superior to both; and that where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than the former." But the word "people" so used is an abstraction. Not necessarily a meaningless or a pernicious one by any means; always charged with emotion, but nonrepresentational-an abstraction obscuring the reality that when the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it. That, without mystic overtones, is what actually happens. It is an altogether different kettle of fish, and it is the reason the charge can be made that judicial review is undemocratic. 293 Whereas Bickel rejected "the People" and popular sovereignty as abstractions, Ackerman wants to imbue those concepts with meaning. 294 Throughout his book, Ackerman extols the way the People, have unconventionally changed the meaning of the Constitution in America's past. 295 Without their creativity, he cannot see "how Americans could have democratically transformed themselves from a decentralized Union of white men to a Nation of all races and creeds whose government-on both federal and state levels-is actively engaged in assuring a better life for all citizens." 2 96 What's done is done. Like legal process scholars, such as Henry Hart in the 1930s, Ackerman admires Americans' imaginativeness in amending the Constitution outside Article V during the New Deal. Recall that Hart and Frankfurter, who were to become the preeminent exponents of the legal process school, wrote unsigned editorials during the 1930s in The New Republic attacking the old Court.
291
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Hart also publicly supported Roosevelt's Court-packing plan, arguing there was no alternative. 1513, 1541 (1998) (equating Ackerman's view with Bickel's "impoverished" concepts of democracy and interpretation and maintaining that "Ackerman is hobbled by the quest for 'the possibility of popular sovereignty,' just as Bickel was haunted by the 'counter-majoritarian difficulty').
295. 
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B. "Never Again!"
So, too, the Ackerman of the 1990s swears off Roosevelt's tactics. He is especially eager to avoid the "Rooseveltian precedent" for constitutional change in the future, he tells us." FDR's manner of changing the Constitution through transformative appointments that yielded amendment-analogues "probably worked a lot better than the formal amendments Americans were likely to enact in the 1930's." 30 1 But the President's vision of constitutional change assigned "too active a role to the Supreme Court and too passive a role to the President, Congress, and the voters." That leads Ackerman to his proposals for taking "the sting out of the Rooseveltian precedent." 3 03
First, he supports the adoption of super-majority requirements for Supreme Court confirmations. If two-thirds of the Senate had to approve nominees, an "ideological President with a weak mandate" would be unable to "ram through a constitutional revolution" with only the support of a bare majority. 3 4 Because the opposing party generally holds at least a third of the Senate, Ackerman's precondition would also thwart presidential efforts to realize their social visions by appointing "constitutional visionaries. They would be obliged to consult with the political opposition and select distinguished professionals who would adopt an evolutionary approach to constitutional interpretation."
05
More sweepingly, Ackerman advances a popular sovereignty initiative by which a successfully reelected President could "signal a constitutional moment" 306 by proposing amendments to the Constitution during his or her second term. If approved by a majority of both Houses, preferably by two-thirds vote, those amendments would appear on the ballots during the next two presidential elections. If voters approved them at the elections (each vote counting as much as any other, without regard to the voter's state of origin), the amendments would be added to the Constitution. "The aim is to register the considered judgments of We the People of the United
States." 307
With these proposals, Ackerman shows that his project is more than an attempt to constitutionalize the New Deal and rescue it from "the junkheap of historical irrelevancy" to which conservative Republicans would consign 300 
it.
3 "' For one thing, the constitutional principles of New Deal liberalism, even as supplemented by the Civil Rights Revolution are a far cry from his own vision of social justice in a liberal state, which would break the hold of a familiar vision of the welfare state by guaranteeing each American reaching early adulthood a one-time stake of $80,000 financed by a 2% annual wealth tax. 0 9 (I query, however, whether in the absence of the enactment of his "stakeholder society," Ackerman considers the New Deal an acceptable minimal alternative and may have turned to history, and perhaps originalism, to legitimate it.) For another, by the very nature of his proposals, he demonstrates that "it should be clear enough" that his history and prescriptions "could be used to legitimate the root and branch repudiation of New Deal liberalism by some future Kemp-Gingrich-Lott trio." 310 
VI. CONCLUSION: WHAT MANNER OF MAN?
What, then, drives Ackerman? "I am in it as a not-so-humble servant of the American People, who seeks to repay part of the great debt I have incurred as I rose out of a poor neighborhood in the Bronx to my present position of local eminence in New Haven," he confides engagingly. 3 ' Since my roots are in the Bronx too, one generation removed, I may be prejudiced. I will say that if I could be certain that everyone in society were as brilliant and caring as Ackerman's parents must have been to produce him, I might endorse his proposals. But I now hail from a state in which popular democracy and referenda have undercut public education and affirmative action. In California, only the federal courts have kept affirmative action alive and prevented public schools from closing their doors to the children of undocumented immigrants." 2 Under those circumstances, the safest route seems to remain a child of the federal courts and the Warren Court in particular. The position also seems consistent with externalism: If one emphasizes the overlap of law and politics and accepts the growth of a Court-centered society as a fact of life in the post-New Deal era, why not hope for a resurgence of courts that will reach one's preferred results? I know my position smacks of elite
